play between these two monsters, however, remains unclear. Can a class be a person necessary for a just adjudication of a dispute between litigants already before the court? At first glance the answer is no. Rule 19(d), "Exception of Class Actions," states that the entire Rule 19 is "subject to the provisions of Rule 23."5 A closer look, however, reveals that Rule 19(d) is not an obstacle to the joinder of a "necessary class."
Few courts have confronted this question head on. In Shimkus v Gersten Companies, 6 the Ninth Circuit rejected the position that Rule 19(d) uniformly excludes classes from joinder. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 19(d) "allows joinder [of classes] to the extent its use does not conflict with Rule 23's provisions.'"' In contrast, several district courts have explicitly or implicitly interpreted Rule 19 to preclude the consideration of classes as necessary parties. 8 These courts apparently view Rule 19(d) as a boundary dividing mutually exclusive mechanisms.
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; orThis Comment argues that allowing for the joinder of necessary classes would facilitate the protection of third parties and the efficient and equitable resolution of disputes. While the Rules already contemplate a number of ways in which the interests of such third parties may be protected, 9 these mechanisms are imperfect. Joinder of necessary classes provides a critical layer of additional protection.
Sections I and II of this Comment outline the nature of the relationship between Rules 19 and 23 and discuss illustrative cases. Section III argues that the history of, and the policies underlying, the joinder rules support the idea that absent classes that satisfy the standards of Rule 19 may be joined. Section IV discusses some limitations on and possible objections to the necessary class. The Comment concludes that Rule 19(d) is not a bar to the joinder of necessary classes.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULE 19 AND RULE 23
A. Overview of the Rules Rule 19(a) provides for the joinder of necessary parties. Three factors commonly determine whether a party is necessary under Rule 19(a). A party is necessary if: (1) without her, the court cannot grant complete relief to the original parties; (2) any relief granted in her absence would expose the original parties to the risk of multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations; or (3) the relief, if granted, would impair the necessary party's own ability to defend a related interest. 1 0 The first situation rarely occurs. 1 " If a necessary party is absent from a suit, the defendant can move under Rule 12(b)(7) to dismiss the claim. 12 The court also may raise the issue of tenant plaintiffs sought to avoid joining class of landlords by relying on Rule 19(d) exception, but court did not reach the issue because absent landlords were not necessary to the action). 9 Among the tools presently available to protect the interests of third parties are intervention of right under Rule 24, notice requirements, consolidation of multiple actions, fairness hearings before court approval of consent decrees, and narrowing the relief available to plaintiffs.
10 FRCP 19(a). 11 See Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 NYU L Rev 1061 , 1081 (1985 .
11 FRCP 12(b) provides: Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto ... except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.
on its own motion. 13 If a necessary party cannot be joined, the court may dismiss the action if it cannot proceed in good conscience without him. 14 While necessary parties are typically joined as defendants, the court may also join them as involuntary plaintiffs. 15 Under Rule 23, class actions must meet four prerequisites: (1) the members of the class are too numerous to join individually; (2) there are questions of law or fact that are common to the class; (3) the claims and defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the entire class; and (4) the class representatives can fairly represent the entire class. 16 Furthermore, Rule 23(b) requires a class to qualify as one of three types: (1) a mandatory class; (2) a class seeking injunctive relief; or (3) a class where common questions of law or fact predominate.' Plaintiffs as a class may join together or a plaintiff may sue defendants as a class.'
The problem of the necessary class typically arises when a plaintiff, P, commences suit against a defendant, D, seeking a remedy that may conflict with the interests of C, a large number of absentees who are unaware of the action or who are too unsophisticated to intervene.' 9 C's interests are often best served when the (2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. See also Provident Bank, 390 US 102 (amplifying the balancing test under Rule 19(b)).
FRCP 19(a).
16 FRCP 23(a).
relief available to P and the outcomes available to D are both limited. Since C desires an outcome different from that sought by P or D, it is incorrect to assume that either P or D will adequately represent C's interests. .0 This paradigmatic triangle of interests most often occurs when the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. 21 Injunctive relief often imposes new standards of conduct on the parties involved in a lawsuit. These new standards may also affect the interests of other groups not party to the suit, and may, in fact, impair their legal rights. For instance, a civil rights injunction calling for a preference for a particular minority group may reduce the number of opportunities available to other minority groups. 22 Alternatively, such a plan may be too ambitious and result in "reverse" discrimination against an unrepresented majority. 23 These risks raise questions about the proper interpretation of consent decrees, 2 4 the legal consequences of a failure to intervene, 25 and the propriety of granting the requested relief. As we shall see, the necessary class concept offers a partial solution to some of these difficulties.
FRD 450 (proposed class of employee-shareholders could not sue the corporation to rescind a merger detrimental to their interests as employees without joining the corporation's nonemployee shareholders); Spirit, 416 F Supp at 1023 (male employees not necessary to a suit by a class of female employees against the administrator of a pension plan); English v Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 465 F2d 43, 47 (5th Cir 1972) (class of white employees or a representative should be joined to an action by African American employees filed against their common employer).
20 To be sure, under Rule 19(a), C would be joined either as a defendant or as an involuntary plaintiff. But this is better than the alternative because neither P nor D represents C's interests sufficiently to justify ignoring C altogether. FRCP 19(a Procedure, 54 Georgetown L J 1204 , 1204 (1966 .
31 Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 365 n 34 (cited in note 13) ("Thoughtful judges, following the older equity tradition, have indeed often considered the question of joinder to be 'entirely practical'. "). In part, Thompson manifests the courts' general hesitation to adapt the geometry of litigation to meet the needs of absentees. 41 This hesitation is based generally on the belief that the interests of absentee classes are either (1) insubstantial, (2) adequately represented by the litigants already before the court, or (3) sufficiently protected by the opportunity to intervene on their own initiative. 4 2 Even where compulsory joinder of an interested class is feasible, some courts have found a "public rights exception." This exception allows the court to deny the joinder of private third parties as necessary in suits by plaintiffs seeking to vindicate public rights. In Eldredge, two female apprentice carpenters brought sex discrimination claims against the Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee (JATC). The district court found that the JATC did not represent the 4,500 employers and 60 unions, and that these absentees had a significant interest in the controversy because a judgment against the JATC would directly increase their hiring costs. Eldredge, 440 F Supp at 523. As the court stated:
The only alternatives appear to be certification of defendant classes or joinder of contractor associations in lieu of individual employer members .... 44 the Ninth Circuit adopted the position that Rules 19 and 23 can work together and ordered the joinder of a necessary class. In the underlying litigation, Shimkus filed a civil rights class action on behalf of a group of African-Americans, charging that the defendant had specifically discriminated against them. A week later, the government filed suit against the defendants, charging them with housing discrimination against all minorities. The court in the government case entered a consent decree enjoining Gersten from discriminating against any minority. Eighteen months later, in the Shimkus case, the court entered a consent decree requiring Gersten to implement an affirmative action program specifically for AfricanAmericans. The Ninth Circuit held that the approval of the second settlement, which preferred African-Americans to the detriment of other minorities, was an abuse of discretion if rendered in the absence of the necessary class of non-African-American minorities. 45 This result required the court to accept some interplay between Rule 19 and Rule 23. The court held that "Rule 19(d) simply requires us to respect the language of Rule 23, but allows joinder to the extent its use does not conflict with Rule 23's provisions. ' 46 The court justified this interpretation of Rule 19(d) by focusing on the language of that section as it existed prior to its separation from 19(a) in 1966, rather than placing undue emphasis on the caption, "Exception of Class Actions."
The division in the courts over the legitimacy of necessary classes turns on how the courts read Rule 19(d). If Thompson is correct in its assumption that the language of the caption to Rule 19(d) controls, then courts would be mistaken to consider classes as "persons" necessary for a just adjudication. If, on the other hand, the language of the caption is not decisive, then the result in Shimkus is a legitimate resolution of the difficulties that arise when absentees are too numerous to join as individuals. 47 The better reading of Rule 19(d) is that once an adequate representative has been joined, Rule 23 makes it unnecessary to join those already represented even if they would otherwise be necessary under Rule 19(a) . This is what is meant by Rule 19(d)'s requirement that the rest of the rule be applied "subject to the provisions of Rule 23. , , 48 A necessary class, then, is simply one that meets both the requirements of Rule 23 (a class) and Rule 19 (necessary to litigation).
The following three sections support this interpretation of Rule 19(d) by examining the historical development of the party joinder rules, their purposes, and the effectiveness of the available alternatives to the necessary class concept. The analysis which follows also provides some basis for appraising the scope and utility of necessary classes relative to other joinder mechanisms.
A. The Historical Context
The class action and the necessary parties rule share a common history in the courts of equity. This history clarifies the reasons for the adoption of Rule 19(d) in 1966 and sheds light on the proper interaction of Rules 19 and 23 today.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English courts of equity developed fairly workable necessary party rules. These rules arose in equity because Chancery afforded a greater opportunity for party joinder than did courts of law, in the interest of achieving "complete justice. '4 This emphasis on a flexible and pragmatic approach to joinder in equity is a useful background for thinking about necessary classes and Rule 19(d) today. Professor Hazard summarized the English rules as follows:
1. All persons who are interested in a controversy are necessary parties to a suit involving that controversy, so that a complete disposition of the dispute may be made.
2. Joinder of necessary parties is excused when it is impossible, impractical, or involves undue complications.
3. A person who is not a party, unless represented by one who is a party, is not bound by a decree. 5 0
These rules migrated to the American courts, became codified in the early state rules of procedure, 51 and, with some changes, were embodied in Rule 19(a). In addition, the notion that some parties were "indispensable" and that a court should dismiss the action if it could not join them also developed in the late eighteenth century in England and the early nineteenth century in America.
52 This concept survives today in Rule 19(b). ss These necessary party rules ultimately proved unsatisfactory, however, in cases with large numbers of such parties; the rise of such cases in the nineteenth century threatened the usefulness of the rules. These problems are illustrated by a passage from the Su- There are some fifteen hundred persons represented by the complainants, and over double that number by the defendants. It is manifest that to require all the parties to be brought upon the record, as is required in a suit at law [per the necessary parties rules], would amount to a denial of justice. The right might be defeated by objections to parties, from the difficulty of ascertaining them, or if ascertained, from the changes constantly occurring by death or otherwise. 5
These practical difficulties led the courts of equity to adopt the class suit in which one member of a class was permitted "to 'stand for' all the class members for purposes of the necessary parties rule. This meant that the action could go forward without individual joinder of all members of the group." 56 The class suit was the forerunner of the modern class action. hen the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.").
N, The class action also has origins in the multiplicity of suits doctrine which enabled equity courts to obtain jurisdiction over a number of separate actions when there was no other basis for jurisdiction. See Bone, 89 Colum L Rev at 29 (cited in note 49). See generally Chafee, Some Problems of Equity at 156-58 (cited in note 2).
58 See General Telephone Co. v Falcon, 457 US 147, 155 (1982) (recognizing the class action as an "exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only"). purposes of the two rules. Rule 19 joinder serves four policy goals: (1) minimizing duplicative litigation; (2) protecting the interests of absentees; (3) protecting certain defendants; and (4) preserving judicial efficiency and integrity. 5 9 Importantly, Rule 23 furthers the same policies. The class action furthers the first two policies cited above by involving those persons most likely to suffer some impairment of interest as a result of the litigation. This involvement conserves judicial resources and minimizes the risk of trampling upon the interests of absentees by granting a remedy that, although not legally binding on the absentees, disposes of the matter for all practical purposes. 6 0 Rule 23 also serves the third and fourth policy goals by reducing the incidence of multiple, inconsistent obligations arising from separate judgments against the defendant. In Shimkus, for example, the housing preferences secured by the African-American class conflicted with the decree already entered on behalf of the nonAfrican-American minority classes. The non-African-American minorities were now doubly disadvantaged by the special treatment afforded the African-Americans in the competition for housing." 1 Not only did this burden the defendant with the additional suits, but it raised the specter of even more litigation to untangle potentially incompatible judgments. This additional litigation would not only be expensive, but the appearance of schizophrenia and caprice would demean the law in the eyes of the public. Rev 809, 813 (1989) .
so This emphasis on practical effects, rather than purely legal consequences (res judicata), is an innovation of the 1966 amendments. This emphasis is also reflected in the changes to Rules 19(b) and 24(a). See Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 365, 402, 405 (cited in note 13).
" 816 F2d at 1321. 62 See McCoid, 28 Stan L Rev at 707 (cited in note 59) ("The specter of public dismay over a system that decides like cases differently is a disturbing one."). tees, 6 3 holding fairness hearings as a prerequisite to the approval of consent decrees, 4 consolidating multiple actions, 6 5 requiring that absentees be given notice, 66 allowing collateral attack by the absentee class, 67 or simply ignoring the absentee class interests. 68 Each of these provisions, however, leaves third parties wholly or partly unprotected. Allowing joinder of necessary classes would provide this lacking protection.
Intervention, particularly if combined with some type of notice provision, offers some advantages over necessary classes. Above all, intervention does not require joinder. Rather, it encourages the absentee to join a suit only when the absentee thinks it worth the effort. 69 In this respect, intervenors are self-regulating and require no procedural hammers or judicial involvement to ensure their participation. Joinder of parties under Rule 19, on the other hand, must be initiated by the plaintiffs or defendants. Moreover, because the intervenor's effort to participate indicates a powerful interest in the case, the standard for asserting a significant interest under Rule 24(a), while technically the same as the standard under Rule 19(a), 7 0 may be weaker. 71 In fact, it is com- 67 See, for example, Martin v Wilks, 490 US 755, 762-63 (1989) . 68 See generally Laycock, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 130-31 (cited in note 19) (though consent decree between litigants may require joinder of absentees under Rule 19, "[t]he rule appears to be more ignored than followed"); Kramer, 87 Mich L Rev at 342 (cited in note 24) (even where absent third parties not denied due process, courts have sometimes treated them "unfairly"). 69 See Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1086 (cited in note 11). 70 Compare FRCP 24(a)(2) (allowing intervention "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties"), with FRCP 19(a)(2) (requiring joinder unless "the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest .... ). 71 Nuesse v Camp, 385 F2d 694, 700 (DC Cir 1967); James and Hazard, Civil Procedure § 10.17 at 553 (cited in note 56).
mon practice to allow both intervention of right and permissive intervention of classes.
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However, intervention does not always support the four policy goals of Rule 19. Rule 24 does not swallow Rule 19. The fact that the Federal Rules separately provide for intervention and necessary parties suggests that Rule 19 handles cases that Rule 24 does not. There are situations, for example, in which the interest in joining the absentees is sufficiently compelling to draw them into the litigation even if they do not wish to join. Also, absentees may be unsophisticated or otherwise unaware of the original litigation. Moreover, even if they do appreciate the threat, they may not be in a position to defend their interests adequately. 73 Because intervention relies on action by the absent parties, the interests of both the court and the defendant are jeopardized as well. Members of the absent class can sue later, seeking relief contrary to that awarded in the first action. 7 4 This potential for incompatible obligations increases the likelihood that future litigation will be necessary to reconcile the competing judgments. It also risks putting the defendant in the unfortunate position of trying to satisfy inconsistent obligations. Thus, even if intervention and notice are sufficient to protect absentees, the court's and the defendant's interests 7 5 should still lean in favor of allowing joinder of necessary classes.
IV. THE SCOPE AND UTILITY OF THE NECESSARY CLASS
The concept of the necessary class, as demonstrated above, is supported both by the history of Rules 19 and 23, and by their common policy goals. Still, questions remain concerning its implementation in actual practice and its utility in comparison with other possible alternatives. Necessary classes, for example, may compromise the settlement options available to the original litigants. 76 They raise questions of who ought to identify absent par-ties, who ought to pay for notice to such parties, and who ought to represent them. 77 Moreover, necessary classes impose more burdens on an already overburdened judiciary. This section examines these difficulties, which judges should recognize as limits on the utility of necessary classes. It then focuses on the three types of class actions authorized in Rule 23 in an effort to discern the scope of necessary classes.
A. Difficulties with the Rule 19 Solution
Rule 19 is not without its own practical difficulties and is not a panacea for situations inadequately addressed by other alternatives. The provisions adopted by the Federal Rules to effect joinder are inadequate to attain fully the purposes underlying joinder. Allowing necessary classes may also encourage inefficient strategic behavior by defendants. Courts should be advised of the availability of the necessary class device, but should also be aware of these difficulties.
Though joinder of necessary parties is desirable, the mechanisms"' adopted by the Federal Rules to achieve it are sometimes ineffective. 79 Rule 19(c), for example, requires that the plaintiff join all necessary parties or state their names in the pleading along device, defendant class actions impose additional burdens on an unwilling group, namely the defendant. The necessary class is also somewhat different, however, in that all of its members are absent from the original litigation. This complete absence makes it more difficult to recognize that the class exists at all, and exacerbates the problems of the unwilling class representative. Necessary classes, unlike defendant class actions, also raise questions of who should bear the costs of notifying and representing these additional litigants, and constrain the original litigants' interests in resolving their bilateral conflict quickly and economically. 45-4.70 at 373-421 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed 1985) .
7 If the absent class is necessary and ought to be joined as a defendant, the court should be able to manage the adequacy of representation by (1) not allowing the action to proceed without the class, and (2) not allowing it to proceed as a class action unless the plaintiff joins an adequate representative from the necessary class. See FRCP 23(d) ; Newberg, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.58 at 399 (cited in note 76) (discussing the court's ability to impose conditions on class actions to ensure that the plaintiff does not select a weak representative for a defendant class).
78 These are the pleading requirements of FRCP 19(c), the defendant's motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(7), and the court's motion to dismiss sua sponte. See Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 374 (cited in note 13).
7'
Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1082 (cited in note 11); McCoid, 28 Stan L Rev at 75 (cited in note 59).
with reasons for nonjoinderY' However, unless the plaintiff and his counsel seek to represent a plaintiff class, or seek to sue a vulnerable defendant class, they have no incentive to complicate the litigation and frustrate their own potential for success by joining other interested parties. 1
A more important enforcement mechanism is Rule 12(b)(7), which provides for dismissal for failure to join a Rule 19 party. Unfortunately, this mechanism is too often ineffective.
8 2 Defendants are unlikely to invite hostile classes into the litigation (which is akin to awakening a sleeping giant), thereby multiplying their potential liability, unless they face an almost certain risk of imminent conflicting obligations and cannot interplead the potential claimants." 3 Similarly, it is not clear that the defendant would wish to risk attracting the attention of the currently sleeping class by making a Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss. A court may also raise the issue of absent but necessary parties on its own motion, but courts do so infrequently.
8 4 Moreover, since misjoinder is a procedural policy issue and not a jurisdictional defect, a judgment rendered in a necessary party's absence is not open to collateral attack in a subsequent action by that party. ' Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1079-80 (cited in note 11) (because, as a practical matter, Rule 19 nonjoinder is only invoked by the defendant, the absentee and society's interests are subject to his litigation strategy). is based on policy considerations such as the efficiency of resolving claims in a single proceeding, misjoinder is less problematic at later stages of the litigation: "By the time the case reached the Court of Appeals, however, the problematic preference on efficiency grounds had entirely disappeared: there was no reason then to throw away a valid judgment just because it did not theoretically settle the whole controversy."). The earlier judgment is not legally binding against the absentee in a subsequent action, but it may be preclusive in a practical sense. See also Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 366 (cited in note 13) ("disappearance of the bugaboo of jurisdiction"); Wright, Miller and Kane, 7 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1611 at 178 (cited in note 47) ("not subject to collateral attack in a subsequent action since . . . the defect is not jurisdictional").
attempt to rectify all of the problems associated with Rule 19, the above discussion does raise an important issue specific to the necessary class context. An expansive interpretation of the existing rules would go a long way to solving this one specific problem.
Joinder of necessary parties requires the judiciary to take an active role in protecting absent claimants and the public. Judges must be attentive to those cases where the class of absentees possesses an interest subject to substantial impairment under Rule 19(a) (2) (i). In the class action context, the necessity of an alert judiciary is even greater. The class action is quite commonly used in areas like civil rights or environmental litigation in which the absentees' lack of sophistication and their inability to afford legal counsel" may have prevented their intervention in the first place.
Courts should also be aware that defendants might find the necessary class a potent weapon against plaintiffs. Defendants have the greatest incentive to raise the issue of absent classes when the absent class would be certified as a codefendant. Because the claimants would bear the initial burden of notice costs, 8 7 the joinder of a new defendant class may deter litigation of the claims., More importantly, the additional defendant class probably will provide litigation support to the defendants and offer little in the way of potential relief for the plaintiff." s Thus, allowing joinder of a necessary class in some instances may perversely increase the incidence of strategic behavior. 9 0 In summary, Rule 19(d) does not preclude joinder of a necessary class, but use of a necessary class does raise some practical considerations. Judges must be aware of those circumstances in 86 The absentees may not be able to afford legal representation for a variety of reasons: they may be poor; their prospects of prevailing may be speculative; or the value of the requested relief-usually an injunction-may be low.
" Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 178 (1974); Meadows v Ford Motor Co., 62 FRD 98, 101-02 (W D Ky 1973) .
Compare Note, 91 Harv L Rev at 647-50 (cited in note 76). 89 A successful judgment against a class of impecunious defendants may not be worth the effort required to collect it.
10 The fact that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction may offset the potential harm to the plaintiff. In Strawbridge v Curtiss, 7 US (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), the Supreme Court held that federal courts obtain diversity jurisdiction over a case only if all parties to the action are diverse. As a result, if a defendant can identify a necessary party who is nondiverse, he can compel joinder of that party and force the case into state court. Allowing joinder of necessary classes may provide a solution to this difficulty. Under Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v Cauble, 266 US 356, 367 (1921) , only the class representative must be diverse. Therefore, if the plaintiff can locate a person in the same situation as the non-diverse necessary party, but who is diverse, the plaintiff can join the necessary individuals as a class with the diverse person as the class representative, and retain the court's diversity jurisdiction. which a truly necessary class is lacking, and also of those circumstances in which a necessary class is not really "necessary," but is joined for purely strategic reasons.
B. Scope of the Necessary Class
A further issue raised by the interplay of Rules 19 and 23 is the question of which Rule takes precedence in determining the existence of a necessary class. Must the class be of a special type under Rule 23(b), or does the standard in Rule 19(a) control? In this section, the Comment argues that Rule 19(a) determines the necessity of joining the class (regardless of how Rule 23 would categorize that class). But, of course, the class must also meet Rule 23's prerequisite and type requirements.
Briefly, for a class to be necessary for a just adjudication, it must meet the standards of Rule 19(a). This means that, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), the class must also qualify as a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) class. Since Rule 23(b)(3) "common question" classes are certified to permit (but not require) the joinder of legally unrelated claims, they cannot be necessary unless they also qualify as Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Rule 23(b)(1) "mandatory classes" essentially consist of Rule 19 parties and can be necessary to an already existing bilateral suit. More problematic, however, are Rule 23(b)(2) "injunctive class actions." Nevertheless, because courts have interpreted Rule 23(b)(1) more narrowly than similar language in 19(a)(2), there will still be some situations where Rule 23(b)(2) classes will be necessary classes under Rule 19. In any event, the key requirement is that the class qualifies as necessary under Rule 19(a). It is irrelevant for these purposes whether the class is a Rule 23(b)(1) class, a Rule 23(b)(2) class, or a Rule 23(b)(3) class, so long as it is one of these.
The Rule 23(b)(1) mandatory class action provides for certification of a class where separate actions by the members of the class could result in "inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class" or adjudications that would "impair or impede" the ability of non-party class members to protect their interests. In other words, a class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) is simply a group of Rule 19 necessary parties, analogous to equity's old representative suit. sary parties rule and the 23(b)(1) class is illustrated when one compares the two prongs of Rule 19(a)(2) with those of Rule 23(b)(1). Both Rules note the risk of multiple, inconsistent obligations and the risk that an adjudication will impair the interests of absentees as the factors to consider when deciding whether the respective rule applies. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes state that the two rules were drafted with similar interests in mind. A Rule 23(b)(3) "common question class action" depends on the predominance of a common question of law or fact. It has no analog in Rule 19. Rule 23(b)(3) evolved out of the multiplicity of suits doctrine which allowed for class suits by groups of people who had unrelated, but essentially identical claims. 9 4 The goal of the doctrine was to reduce administrative costs and to streamline litigation by resolving factually similar cases in a single action. 5 Since the "common question class action" represents an example of permissive joinder and depends more on considerations of convenience, it is unlikely to implicate Rule 19 and require joinder unless the class also qualifies as a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) class.
for necessary classes, whose interests might be protected by injunctive relief. 1 0 0 Necessary classes may have a stronger case, moreover, in that without some representation in the litigation their interests will be affected in their absence. At least in the ordinary defendant class action the original defendant offers some protection even if the court refuses to certify a class.
CONCLUSION
The joinder of necessary classes under Rule 19 is an important mechanism for the protection of absent classes. Rule 19(d) does not impede, but rather encourages, the joinder of classes where they are necessary for a just adjudication. Section (d)'s purpose, as illuminated by historical and policy considerations, is simply to obviate the need in any class action to join all absent class members once an adequate representative has been joined. This provision preserves the utility of the class action as a device for convenient and efficient adjudication. Indeed, Rule 19 is a superior mechanism where disputes concerning several classes threaten to impair the interests of unsophisticated groups of absentees, and may also offer an end-run around diversity problems created by Rule 19(b).
